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I
Scientific measurements are normally a good empi-
rical basis even for long term forecasting. But unfor-
tunately this is not the case for economic forecasts of 
average rates of aggregate economic change. This is 
so for three main reasons. 
First, national account statistics have been standar-
dized since about half a century by the United Na-
tions; but these statistics are extremely short run in 
nature and there is no agreed standard procedure for 
correcting mistakes that become manifest already 
after one year or in some cases even after only half 
a year.
Secondly, precise estimations are only possible for 
commodities with market prices, i.e. for at best one 
sixth of the entire gross domestic product. Estimates 
can be calculated only for these marketable commo-
dities, both in nominal values (i.e. values including 
inflation) and also in real values (i.e. market values 
corrected for inflation). But in developed economies 
between some 40 and up to 57% (in case of France) 
of all national products are provided by governments. 
And the cost prices assumed for services supplied 
by governments may be quite different from (most 
probably higher than) what prices would be if the 
services in question were provided in competitive 
markets. This error is small, however, compared with 
estimation of government productivity changes, i.e. 
the calculation of real prices for government services: 
In the 1950s, government productivity change was 
estimated most laboriously by Solomon Fabricant, 
and estimated as one percent a year. And this estima-
te has been used in the developed world everywhere. 
It would be somewhat heretical to suggest that at pre-
sent government services no longer show such a pro-
ductivity increase of one percent a year, because by 
now there is in many countries strong political pres-
sure to increase public salaries, but little pressure to 
increase public service productivity at all (if not even 
to lower it). Public salaries are no longer an indica-
tion of public services rendered. The most interesting 
problem occurred in the case of France already in the 
early 1960s. French authorities simply declared that 
in France public service productivity increased not 
by 1%, but much rather by 3% annually. Thus, esti-
mated average French real income growth rates jum-
ped up by about three quarters of a percentage point 
of GDP each year and a marvellous economic growth 
increase of France resulted. Much of growth accoun-
ting is thus merely ideologically biased guesswork.
The third difficulty is that even in markets monopo-
ly or oligopoly prices can be kept at insupportably 
high levels for considerable periods, resulting in an 
excessively high social product – which, as already 
said, will usually never be corrected downward. Such 
prices can be set far from equilibrium prices for long 
periods, in particular in sectors of political interest. 
A vast number of people are interested in such exces-
sive market prices for advertising and other marke-
ting reasons; to doubt such market prices, which later 
prove false, is once more thought to be a dangerous 
"heresy": one simply must not cast such doubt. 
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The most notorious case was the faulty evaluation of 
bank credit for politically motivated house purchases 
by indigent US citizens in 2005 to 2008. 
To sum up this point: National income statistics are 
not at all objective, but can be cast in doubt in very 
many different ways. Apparently objective basic eco-
nomic figures are not much different from politically 
motivated propaganda, the true nature of which is 
realized only by few observers – as with all good po-
litical propaganda.
II
"Finance, like any other industry, is chiefly regulated 
by people taking responsibility for their actions" wro-
te The Economist, March 29th 2008, p. 17, when the re-
cent, above all US American, financial crisis with the 
near bankruptcy and forced "rescue" of the banking 
house Bear Stearns started to become critical. The 
statement is highly misleading, however, as in recent 
years – in contrast to 150 or 100 years earlier – The 
Economist tends to be far too optimistic. Again and 
again, governments nowadays assume what should 
be the financial responsibility of private people, i.e. 
they heavily subsidize financial markets, eventually 
at the domestic taxpayers' cost. To a large extent, fi-
nance is no longer regulated privately! The quoted ar-
ticle continues: "The Fed has signalled that it will now 
[i.e. by March 2008] stand behind investment banks 
like Bear, and it has agreed to provide emergency len-
ding to them for the first time since the Depression", 
i.e. since the 1930s. But this was not the end: "Fed" 
financing was repeated again and again, at near zero 
interest rates as cost. The recent Great Crisis proved 
very costly for American and also for European tax-
payers. But if emergency costs rise too high, govern-
ments will even go bankrupt, a bankruptcy that is al-
ways voluntary, as no international law enforcement 
against sovereign states exists. Since August 1st 2014 
Argentina, which had gone bankrupt to the highest 
ever degree in 2001–2002 by agreeing to pay only 
30% of its international debts (while 50% payment in 
international bankruptcy cases had been usual up to 
then) has been in the throes of a second international 
bankruptcy by not paying a sum due according to a 
valid US debt judgement. The pressing question now 
is, as the USA is constantly increasing its sovereign 
debt and at hardly diminished rates: When will the 
United States declare (some sort of) bankruptcy? At 
present, there are so many influential agents  – banks 
in particular – interested in overestimating national 
incomes that seemingly objective measurements re-
sult in officially maintained lies.
In the critical year 2008 the USA had one of its lar-
gest yearly current account deficits of (according to 
The Economist, March 29th 2008, p. 110) 738.6 billion 
dollars or 4.7% of its then GDP. (In 2006 and 2007 
this deficit had been relatively even higher rising up 
to 6.5% of its then current account.) This 2008 deficit 
had been financed to about one third each by Ger-
many (256.7 billion dollars), by China (249.9 billion 
dollars [2006 figure]) and by Japan (214.7 billion dol-
lars) – their surpluses in sum with 721.3 billion dol-
lars slightly less than the US deficit. Those three cur-
rent account surpluses were then the world's largest.
At present the US has still by far the largest current 
account deficit, though with now (The Economist, 
September 6th 2014, p. 84) 405.9 billion dollars it 
is nominally only 55% of that of 2008. It is now fi-
nanced to more than 64% by Germany with 262.9 
billion dollars current account surplus, nearly the 
same as in 2008, and secondly to 40% or 163.6 bil-
lion dollars by China, nominally only two thirds as 
high as in 2008. In the meantime, Japan has dropped 
out of substantial international finance. The third 
and fourth largest international current account sur-
plus contributions are now provided by Saudi Arabia 
(132.9 billion dollars) and Switzerland (105.4 billion 
dollars), these two with the only positive current ac-
count contributions of more than 100 billion dollars. 
(In 2008, Saudi Arabia had with 98.9 billion [figure 
from 2006] kept just below 100 billion.) Both in 2008 
and now in 2014 the second largest current account 
deficit (and the only one in excess of –100 billion dol-
lars) was engendered by Britain: according to the two 
issues quoted of The Economist –129.4 billion dollars 
in 2008 and –117.7 billion in 2014. 
The USA persistently simply ignores the relevance of 
its current account deficits. But at best any Austrian 
should know from Raimund's tragicomedy Der Ver-
schwender (modelled after the bankruptcy of the Vi-
ennese court banker Count Fries), that in the long 
run one cannot spend more than one has or earns, 
even though for some time everybody loves to give 
credit to a spendthrift. One can often hear that at 
present the whole world loves to give credit to the 
USA, but this international credit giving to the USA, 
which has gone on for 35 years now (since 1980 with 
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the sole small exception of the year 1991, the year of 
the first Iraq war), cannot go on indefinitely. Already, 
the USA is rapidly approaching the relative interna-
tional public indebtedness of Italy (Italy now having 
a debt of 135% of one year's GDP).  The USA is now 
annually increasing its international indebtedness, as 
already stated, by 405.9 billion dollars on current ac-
count, and that is nearly four times more than the next 
international debtor, Britain, with, as stated, additio-
nal 117.7 billion.
If one adds up the yearly current account deficits 
the US deficits alone amount to about 40% of all the 
current account deficits in the world, which is huge 
– though still somewhat smaller than around 2005, 
when the US current account deficit was about two 
thirds of the world's deficits. Relatively speaking, the 
USA now shows an annual GDP increase of +2.1%, 
but a current account (CA) deficit of –2.4% of its GP, 
in sum a net "growth rate" of  –0.3%, in other words 
a decline. Relatively speaking (though nominally by 
far the largest) it is at present only the ninth largest 
deficit accumulator. South Africa comes first on this 
negative list with +2.0% GDP and –5.4% CA deficit, 
together –3.4%. Next is Turkey with +3.0% GDP and 
–5.8% CA deficit, together –2.8%. Brazil is third with 
+1% GDP, but –3.7% CA deficit, together –2.7%. Ar-
gentina comes fourth and is the only country with 
negative GDP growth as well: –1.4% and –0.9% CA 
deficit, together –2.3%. Relatively much smaller de-
ficit accumulators are Egypt (+1.8% GDP, –2.5% CA 
deficit), France (+0.5% GDP, –1.2% CA deficit) and 
Britain (+3.2% GDP, –3.7% CA deficit); in eighth 
place is Canada (+2.3% GDP, –2.8% CA deficit). 
Once more adding up GDP growth and the frequent-
ly relatively very large current account surpluses, the 
most rapidly growing countries – each with at least 
+10% growth plus current account surplus  – are in 
descending order: Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, 
Switzerland, Norway, Malaysia and the Netherlands. 
In this growth order Austria (according to The Eco-
nomist) would come sixteenth with +1.4% GDP 
growth estimate and +2.5% current account surplus 
relative to GDP.
In a longer run view the fact that for the last thirteen 
years, but especially so since 2001, the US economy 
has actually been shrinking, is one of the most im-
portant reasons why world per capita income, at least 
in the developed world, is now on average constantly 
declining. We shall come to this point towards the 
end of this paper. 
According to the Economist publication "The World 
in 2014", pp. 91–99, estimated 2014 income levels in 
purchasing power parity terms per capita show Nor-
way to be first in the world with PPP $70,250. Hong 
Kong is second with $56.240 per head in PPP terms, 
and Switzerland third with PPP $55.720. The USA is 
fourth with $54.920. Qatar is not given and neither 
is tiny Luxembourg. Singapore comes next with PPP 
$49.280. But then as in PPP terms "richest" in EU Eu-
rope (apart from Luxembourg) Austria is shown as 
eighth richest with in PPP terms $45.340 per head, 
i.e. only about 20% below the USA. Public percep-
tion tends to be quite different:  the shrinking USA 
usually being seen as highly flourishing, even if stan-
dard statistics show the opposite, the USA actually 
having declined already for many decades. 
III
Such are the figures where the relative decline of the 
USA is already astounding, though simply ignored 
by the USA. But now we come to the many cases 
where the figures are actually highly misleading, be-
cause they are calculated on an extremely short run 
basis, without subsequent corrections for long run 
accounting mistakes. 
The first major accounting mistake should certainly 
be common knowledge among statistically informed 
persons, but strangely enough is not. How are all 
national accounting figures calculated? They are cal-
culated quite differently from any private accounting 
framework, both for physical persons and for firms: 
For these, they have to be calculated according to the 
amount of money (or its equivalent) actually paid 
and actually received. 
Even in private accounting with long term contracts 
estimates of future receipts gain in importance; and 
the financial downswing since the year 2000 signi-
ficantly started with gigantic accounting errors and 
the bankruptcy of Enron in December 2000 – a firm 
that had habitually made wildly exaggerated forecasts 
of its future receipts and eventually failed even on its 
pension promises to the tens of thousands of its em-
ployees. Of course government bankruptcies of many 
developing nations, the largest so far being, as stated, 
that of Argentina, are similar.
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But these private accounting mistakes are still rela-
tively small compared to those in national accounts: 
they are mistakes of wrong accounting in contrast to 
standard national accounts, where the mistake is one 
of simply NO accounting at all. In national accounts, 
sums of money actually received within one calen-
dar year are added to the sums shown on invoices 
sent out – perhaps to be received in the future. But 
whether such invoices that are carried over from the 
present into the next calendar (= accounting) year 
are actually paid is never ascertained! Put differently, 
it is implicitly assumed that all invoices are always 
fully honoured!
This was a fairly reasonable assumption when inter-
national credits were usually granted for very short 
periods only, but with longer and longer credit lines 
the assumption became highly problematic. It beca-
me a fatal miscalculation for the USA in 2006–2009, 
when for political reasons large-scale sales of new-
ly built private homes to subprime debtors became 
a major business: sales at excessive prices and up to 
100% on credit! Of course these debts remained lar-
gely unpaid and US national income was overestima-
ted in terms of trillions of dollars. To a much smaller 
extent other national incomes, in particular Italian 
and Greek ones, were overestimated for the same re-
ason. Once more the mistake is that national income 
statistics do not even ask whether invoices carried 
over from one year to the next are ever actually paid. 
The Governor of the Federal Reserve, Alan Green-
span, who had been mainly responsible for these 
miscalculations, later estimated that worldwide new-
ly built homes had been overvalued by 40 trillion 
dollars or by two thirds of one year's world national 
income – in the USA alone by about 17 trillion dol-
lars or about 120% of one year's US gross domestic 
product. Calculated over the entire first decade of the 
21st century that would be an overestimation of about 
9% (!) a year: Many US houses had been sold – in the 
vain hope of future price rises – at 110–120% even of 
their excessive current price and had then fallen to 
about two thirds of that price. Even when the price 
fell soon after it had proved excessive and was actu-
ally only about two thirds as large this would yield an 
overestimation of US GDP of about 6% a year. The 
calculated US economic growth rate over the who-
le first decade of the 21st century was some 2.2% per 
year or at most perhaps 2.5%. So just this one correc-
tion of taking into account average housing price ca-
pital losses per year would reduce the "true" growth 
rate of the US gross national product to actually a 
somewhat more than 3% annual decline in the first 
decade of the 21st century. And that is only one of the 
necessary downward corrections! Many others will 
have to be made as well. The necessary deduction 
for income overestimation will probably not remain 
as high as in the first decade after the secular boom 
period of the 1990s, but it will be substantial, parti-
cularly for the USA. 
IV
We come to a third necessary downward correction 
of the yearly rise (actually: constant decline) in so-
cial product. The usual national income forecasts 
are made on the simplifying assumption that relative 
prices do not shift over time, which basically means 
that we assume only one single commodity consu-
med. This also implies that we assume all different 
commodities show the same unitary income elastici-
ty and negative unitary price elasticity of demand. But 
this assumption is extremely far-fetched. Actually, 
both income and (in absolute value)  price elasticities 
of demand for so called "necessities"  are much rather 
relatively close to zero, i.e. even with relatively fal-
ling incomes expenditures on these commodities can 
hardly be reduced. Necessities rising in price make 
for real income decline.
These necessities are of three kinds: most important 
are foodstuffs, second energy supply (especially fuel 
demand), and third a vital commodity, which, in de-
veloped economies, has so far been supplied at extre-
mely low cost and is therefore commonly forgotten 
in income analyses: the supply of clean water. Let us 
neglect the supply of services, which in some cases, 
like telephone calls, can be expanded at virtually no 
extra cost. If, for Austria and comparable countries, 
we assume a correctly calculated decline in the value 
of material product of  2% a year and no population 
change – in fact a highly conservative estimate consi-
dering the enormous immigration pressures on Aus-
tria – then in fifty years' time (which is my forecas-
ting horizon), in 2065, real income per capita would 
be about one third of what it is now. Around 2005, 
food consumption in Austria took up about 12.5% 
of disposable income, leaving out, however, alcoho-
lic beverages and food consumption in restaurants. 
With a drop in national income to one third the 
hardly reducible consumption of food would thus 
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require about one third of national income, with a 
safety margin of say, plus or minus 10% of the then 
social product (a safety margin for both smaller or 
higher income decline than 2% a year). Mineral oil 
has increased in price since the year 2005 from about 
11 € per barrel to about 65 €, its price being six times 
as high as nine years ago; and it will increase in price 
in the future by further leaps and bounds. Even assu-
ming further drastic demand reductions and a chan-
ged demand structure (think of alternative energies) 
fuel demand will have to take a substantial share of 
total income demand. And the same will be true of 
water demand, water rapidly becoming more costly 
every decade, even in Austria with its abundant wa-
ter supply (by some estimates Austria is third richest 
in water, worldwide). The Economist, September 27th 
2014, said on p. 14: "Householders are scarcely aware 
that water has a value" and noted for China –  and 
of course not only for China – the need "to price its 
water properly". Thus in 2065, expenditure on food, 
fuel and water is likely to absorb one half, certainly 
not less than 40%, of all disposable income. 
In forecasting cost and demand of those three basic 
necessities, food, energy, and water, we are faced with 
estimation problems due to the following two sim-
plifying assumptions: Firstly, it is wrong to estimate 
future real income under the implicit assumption of 
a constant-over-time price structure of supplies. Cer-
tain commodities will become progressively scarcer 
over time and will therefore rise in price. The most 
important cases are on the one hand fuel and on the 
other water. Consumer demand for food can be re-
duced to some extent, but not sufficiently to offset 
the price rises likely to occur. So we shall be faced 
with problems of general impoverishment over time. 
The second methodological problem is that for 
50-year-forecasts we must not look at the effect of 
base period quantity weights of commodities in con-
sidering the diminution of welfare. Much rather we 
have to look at the much higher end of period weights 
of demand for these commodities of growing scarcity. 
The likely end period weights in 2065 of the demand 
for food, for fuel, especially mineral oil, and for water 
(the demand for which is likely to be around one half 
of total income expenditure of the average income 
earner for a country like Austria) will imply that real 
income (leaving services aside) will drastically decli-
ne in such a typical European country, as well as in 
North America and Oceania. I leave out of my esti-
mation the real income demand in all less developed 
countries, because the very long term social changes 
about to occur in the less developed world are to 
my mind too difficult to forecast for an economist. I 
warn, however, that to see the less developed world 
as only a somewhat poorer USA is an unsupportable 
US-centred perspective.
Gerhart Bruckmann has reminded me that already 
decades ago Oskar Morgenstern, in a well-known 
survey, estimated that national accounts are at best 
up to plus or minus three percent correct. Nowadays 
with increasingly long-term accounting problems 
this error tends to be substantially larger.
As errors of calculation are, however, highly correla-
ted over time the rates of change of aggregate valu-
es are likely to be in absolute terms less error-prone 
than these aggregate values themselves.
Even larger errors than in national income accounts 
are likely to occur in national wealth estimations.
V
A fourth route for long run economic forecasting 
is to take foreseeable environmental changes into 
account. Some economists in the or close to the 
Austrian Academy of Sciences are conscious of this 
problem, particularly Verena Winiwarter and in 
some aspects Alexia Fürnkranz-Prskawetz. But it is 
good to be explicit on the topic especially of average 
temperature increase by 2065. 
From about 1900 to 2001 there has been registered an 
increase in average annual temperature of altogether 
0.8 °C in Europe and North America. Then a pause 
in the temperature increase occurred, noticeably in 
Europe. This was due to the Atlantic Ocean tempo-
rarily absorbing most of the temperature increase – 
with the consequence, however, that the Gulf Stream, 
which used to warm much of North Western Europe, 
by now has a very much reduced effect. This makes 
parts of North Western Europe even colder than 
before. The average increase in global temperatures 
from 1900 up to 2065 is likely to be some 2 to per-
haps 3 °C , i.e. a further increase of 1.2– 2.2 °C from 
now on. 
In the Austrian Alps such increase of average temper-
ature by some 2 °C since 1900 has already taken place, 
causing vegetation to flourish up to 200 to 300 me-
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ters higher than in 1900 – a similar situation to what 
it had been some 6000 years ago when "Ötzi" crossed 
the Austrian Alps. That also means that virtually all 
the Alps' glaciers will have melted away by 2065, with 
the exception perhaps of the Aletsch-glacier. 
Higher average temperatures will entail considerable 
desertification, already of Southern Europe and es-
pecially of Northern Africa. The yield of cereals will 
therefore decline substantially, with resulting price 
rises. It is not at all clear whether the then higher 
temperatures in Northern Russia and in Siberia will 
be able to compensate such losses and cost increase. 
Needless to say, desertification will intensify the al-
ready serious water shortages. 
One more important effect of global warming has to 
be remarked upon, viz. the increase in the frequency 
and intensity of hurricanes, storms, and floods over 
the past quarter century – most noticeable in the 
Carribean and consequently in the USA. This, by the 
way, is the only negative effect of global warming that 
has so far been able to impress itself on US public 
opinion.  
Here we come to one more serious miscalculation – 
or simply mistake – in national income accounting: 
The negative income effects of natural catastrophes 
are in standard calculation seen as chance effects, 
which national income calculations ignore. The costs 
of repairs of damages, on the other hand, are seen 
as additional wealth creation. So, curiously enough, 
though wrongly, weather catastrophes end up as in-
creasing national incomes! Any sensible calculation 
should register the damages as decreases of net in-
come. That is particularly important in view of the 
global tendency of weather extremes to increase over 
time, implying increasing damages, of course, and a 
further fall of average consumable national incomes 
in the period up to 2065. 
VI
A fifth cause of miscalculation of economic welfare 
is the standard miscalculation of environmental da-
mages, a topic similar to the previous one. Methodo-
logically the problem is once more twofold: Firstly, 
environmental costs are often classified as income 
increasing benefits. And secondly, the increase of en-
vironmental damages over time is ignored. 
But perhaps environmental damages will not increa-
se over time. For in reasonably wealthy economies – 
and I consider only such – public demand for a clean 
and healthy environment is increasing. This would 
still mean, however, that higher costs to keep the en-
vironment clean and healthy would entail increasing 
costs over time to keep it so. So if there should be 
a smaller deduction from wealth due to smaller da-
mages there would be a larger deduction due to the 
increasing costs of keeping damages low.
To illustrate the problem let us assume that an in-
dustrial plant needs a water supply from the main 
or from a river; or that an industrial plant wishes to 
emit smoke due to some firing process. With efficient 
legal and technical controls as to quantity and qua-
lity of the respective emissions this need not result 
in environmental problems. But costs will be higher 
and net benefits lower. Furthermore, environmental 
losses will occur in two other ways: firstly, legal con-
trol costs are wrongly reckoned as "benefits", i.e. as 
income, just like the costs of all other government 
actions. Here we have a first case of governmental ac-
tion reckoned as a benefit, while actually it is a cost of 
producing social welfare and as such should be sub-
tracted from the benefit. (To this problem in its more 
general form we shall come later). 
Secondly, many environmental damages have not yet 
been realised in all their ramifications. E.g. the in-
direct damages of DDT were not realized for a long 
time; neither were the long-term damages of atomic 
bomb tests. These costs cannot be ignored. Once 
more, true benefits or gains will be known much bet-
ter at the end of a longer period, i.e. in our case only 
judged as benefits when viewed from the year 2065 
backward, when their true costs have been ascertai-
ned. 
In case of nuclear power plants the staggering costs 
of the final disposal of fuel rods are uncertain, with 
estimates constantly increasing.
Frequently, however, environmental costs of indus-
trial production are not taken into account as social 
costs: Water taken up for production purposes from 
a river is allowed to be readmitted as soiled water 
(or at least partly soiled water) back into the river; 
and smoke may be emitted as by-product of indus-
trial life. In this case industrial production costs are 
actually figured too low and the environmental da-
mage is a double one: Calculated cost of production 
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is too low (relative to true cost) and because of too 
low a price of production calculated production be-
nefit is likely to be too high. Such environmentally 
damaging production can often be maintained only 
by ignoring true cost: if it were calculated at its true 
cost it would no longer be profitable – an argument 
ignoring the optimal total efficiency of production.
Thus in present national accounting standards the 
costs of environmental damages are wrongly ignored, 
costs are to quite a large extent miscalculated as too 
low, and finally benefits are assumed to occur where 
there are actually none.
VII
A sixth case of necessary corrections in national in-
come calculation has to do with the common treat-
ment of governmental services. Public services should 
rightly be treated as mere intermediate products or, 
to put it differently, as mere costs of providing con-
sumption, investment, or export goods, and should 
therefore be subtracted from final gains. For "soci-
al product" proper is only – in market economies – 
what private individuals are finally willing to pay for.
Gerhart Bruckmann pointed out to me that simul-
taneously with an increase of social product in the 
narrow and truest sense so-called regrettables also 
increase: the cost of police, the cost of necessary 
tax inspectors, the cost of security guards and so on. 
Frequently military costs also increase parallel to the 
increase of the social product proper. 
This was a controversial question already at the time 
when national income accounting was originally 
developed in the late 1930s. The early theorists of 
national accounting – Keynes, the eventual Nobel 
Laureate James Meade, Colin Clark, who was first 
in estimating national incomes (cited in Keynes' 
General Theory, p. 102) and the eventual Nobel 
Laureate S.S. Kuznets – were salaried public servants 
for at least some of their working time; this may be 
the reason why it was decided to consider their sala-
ries as remuneration for public services. But this veils 
a theoretical problem and amounts to some double 
counting. 
Secondly, the price actually received from the final 
demander (i.e. the eventual private consumer, inves-
tor or exporter) is considered when estimating social 
product. The question is if – with no public provisi-
on – some private demander would have been wil-
ling alternatively to pay for the respective service, a 
highly doubtful possibility. Public services are often 
provided where there is no will to pay privately. Here 
something is counted as product, which would not 
have been provided for and paid privately. It is in fact 
only an exploitative payment in the interest of agents 
in public authority! 
Large parts of public expenditure are, of course, crea-
ting private benefits and would in other types of so-
cial arrangements have to be provided privately and 
frequently are provided privately so. This is true abo-
ve all for expenditures for educational and for health 
care purposes and for the provision of infrastructure 
and public utilities. These are clearly part of the soci-
al product. But here the question is whether private 
provision, correctly priced, would not be less cost-
ly than (frequently inefficient or monopolistically 
bloated) public provision of the goods in question. 
Of course, there are cases, however, where public 
provision will prove cheaper than alternative priva-
te provision: viz. if private provision would generate 
protected monopoly profits. 
An example for the necessity of downward correc-
tion for monopolistic profits would be the US health 
care system, which at the cost of now more than 18% 
(tendency: rising) of US national income is very ex-
pensive. At that, it does not even cover more than 10 
to 15% of Americans. Thus it is about twice as ex-
pensive as the usual 10–12% European health care 
expenditure, which covers more or less the total po-
pulation. The high US health care cost may be due to 
excessive fees especially of top doctors and also of the 
health administration officials, as well as the excessi-
vely high premiums doctors pay to insure themselves 
against suits for malpractice in the problematic US 
legal system. 
A further inefficiency of public provision in the USA 
which should be corrected downwards when compa-
ring optimal private services with inefficient public 
ones: The USA produces double the amount of lawy-
ers' services per unit of social welfare, as compared 
with Europe. This has to do with US tort law, which 
allows juries to adjudicate damages. Gynaecologists, 
e.g., are in fact frequently no longer insurable for 
damages in the USA: About 0,05% of women die in 
childbirth, without any fault of the medical atten-
dants; but in the USA the lawyers for the aggrieved 
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families will always persuade a jury that the treating 
doctor was at fault and in addition would gain them 
huge damages, their own legal fees also having to 
be paid by the doctors. In the USA excessive fees 
for health provision and in addition excessive fees 
of lawyers in inefficient legal procedures relating to 
health services unnecessarily overvalue health costs 
in national income calculation and should be correc-
ted downwards. 
This touches a further problem: In public accoun-
ting, pension payments, both private and public and 
also subsidies to individuals or firms, are correctly 
considered as mere transfers between individuals, 
transfers that do not increase social welfare. (The ef-
fect of income redistribution between persons, even 
if sometimes increasing the sum of total utilities, is 
never treated in social accounting.) But many public 
salaries are actually subsidies to individuals without 
any official duties. If so, it is wrong to include them 
in national incomes. Recently, this has occurred to a 
large extent in Greece. Former Greek governments 
had created large numbers of additional public jobs, 
mere sinecures, for people they considered their cli-
entele; and as the parties in government switched, 
different clienteles profited. As none of those people 
produced much, their public salaries and pensions 
have been one of the reasons for the infamous overe-
stimation of Greek social product.
There are many cases of very large governmental 
expenditure – take the 57% of social product spent 
on public account in France – where commensurate 
public benefits are highly doubtful (in contrast to the 
private benefits for the recipients).  
VIII
I turn to a seventh cause of declines in national inco-
mes: climate change, above all rising average tempe-
ratures, already estimated above to be (from 2005 to 
2065) of the order of magnitude of 1.2 –2.2 °C. I have 
already touched upon the topic above, but will here 
try to cover more of the relevant aspects.
Typically, natural scientists focus on longer run cli-
mate change effects, while economists tend rather to 
belittle negative climate change forecasts, because of 
their usually very short run perspectives. With res-
pect to climate change, even economists, however, 
will very soon have to change to longer run conside-
rations.
A first effect of average temperature increase will be 
in the more temperate regions of the northern he-
misphere, i.e. particularly in Europe, where summer 
temperatures will rise and hotter periods will be 
more bunched together. Precipitation will be more 
unevenly distributed over the year and, as mentioned 
already, damaging storms will increase. This will lead 
to less vegetation of use to human beings and thus 
to price increases: As mentioned above, from 2005 
to 2014 European food prices have already risen on 
average by 2% more than industrial ones.
A second effect will be due to a greater need for 
renew able fuels with the exhaustion particularly of 
cheaper exploitable deposits of mineral oil and coal. 
In temperate zones, more and more wood will be 
needed for firing. This means that deforestation, up 
to recently still increasing, will have to be stopped 
and the amount of forest cover will increase. This 
is seen particularly in Austria, one of the relatively 
densely forested rich countries. Increasing forest 
cover will slightly slow climate warming. But it will 
have the effect that less of the soil will be available 
for pastures and grain production – with the usual 
consequence of rising food prices. 
Furthermore a considerable degree of warming of 
the oceans has to be expected. A substantial amount 
of the climate warming effect will go less into the 
atmosphere, but rather into ocean warming. This 
will make fishing "harvests" smaller and more cost-
ly: Many of the nutritious larger fish live in relatively 
cold waters, but these will heat up. Warmer oceans 
favour the development of more algae. But algae are 
not readily consumable by human beings and also 
tend to diminish free oxygen in the sea, thus causing 
living conditions for fish to deteriorate. 
Advocates of "fracking" and like processes maintain 
that the progressive exhaustion of extractable mine-
ral oil is much exaggerated: Additional finds of shale 
oil and of natural gas should be ground for optimism 
that oil production can go on as before.
But total exhaustion of a resource has always been 
and still is an unrealistic and uneconomic idea: What 
really happens is a progressive increase of the cost 
of extraction over time. Total exhaustion will never 
occur, because at some point extraction becomes 
too costly, relative to alternative energies. Further 
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mineral oil deposits have to be extracted ever deeper 
down in the ocean – now deeper than 5000 meters 
below the sea surface; and the same is true for the 
extraction of shale oil and mineral gas below the land 
surface. Progressive cost increase over time implies 
that more and more resources would have to be em-
ployed in the extraction of scarce mineral fuel – re-
sources that are missed in other employments. This 
will eventually limit the demand for oil. 
Of course, it is not yet clear in detail what further 
"scarcities" substantial global average temperature in-
creases of 1.2–2.2 °C will bring about in the coming 
fifty years. But they will certainly lead to cost and pri-
ce rises due to exhaustion of certain resources, there-
by limiting economic growth and making it negative 
in effect: Progressive climate change will thus make 
all of us progressively poorer!
IX
My final problem is the increasing level of interna-
tional credits with doubtful returns, which more 
critically could be termed gifts or near gifts by public 
authorities, especially since the year 2000. 
From 1994–1999, the world experienced its fifth 
Kondratieff-Peak (since 1785) – Kondratieffs being 
the forty to sixty year periods between peaks of in-
novations and correspondingly of investment. In the 
USA and Europe this fifth peak showed GDP growth 
rates of 5% and more. As the relevant innovations 
were capital saving ones there were surprisingly little 
further investment needs after the end of the boom 
in the year 2000 (with the first great bankruptcy, that 
of Enron in December 2000). So the world sudden-
ly switched from high investment needs to surplus 
world saving intentions and that from 2000 to still 
now in 2014. The saving surplus actually creates a 
second kind of gift.
However, especially after the boom years of 1994 to 
1999 with increasing investment opportunities the 
sudden disappearance of such opportunities was ge-
nerally not believed. In particular, large banks pro-
mised continuing investment opportunities, which 
were, however, no longer there. Interest rates should 
have fallen immediately, because there was a world 
excess of saving intentions. But they fell far too slow-
ly – although by now they are reaching near zero in 
Germany and in other EU countries economically 
close to Germany. As market interest rates fell much 
too slowly banks wrongly believed they were earning 
(overestimated) interest on doubtful financial invest-
ments.
In the US private sector, too, there reigned all sorts 
of mistaken beliefs. During the 1994–1999 boom, 
private saving nearly stopped because people wron-
gly believed they were getting richer from what were 
actually only temporary stock market gains (stock 
market assets being held in the USA by about one 
half of US private households). And some eight years 
later US householders wrongly believed they were 
getting richer without actual saving by equally illu-
sory house price increases. The savings rate of the US 
private sector fell to minus (!) 2% in 2006 and 2007.
Alan Greenspan, Federal Reserve Governor from 
1986–2006, did his utmost to maintain public illusi-
ons about the economic and financial situation. As 
a Republican he tried to save the standing of Repu-
blican US President Bush II when unexpectedly two 
months after his inauguration a recession hit already 
in March 2001. Greenspan drastically reduced the 
Federal Reserve interest rate in 2001 from 6.5% to 
1.75% and soon after to 1%. It was he who initiated 
near zero central bank interest rates, which since 
then have become common and are actually nothing 
but subsidies for large banks; or in other words pub-
lic gifts to private banks. 
A government campaign encouraging a general spen-
ding spree after the "9/11" attacks on the USA plus 
Greenspan's "policy" assured the re-election of Bush 
II in 2004. So for 13 years now and worldwide, we 
have had very low central bank interest rates, which 
actually are largely gifts. 
For the USA the special feature was that already Pre-
sident Clinton had initiated a policy to increase the 
percentage of Americans owning their homes, exten-
ding the percentage of house owners from about 60 
to around 69% of householders. Particularly under 
Greenspan in the final years of this program (2005–
2007) down payments were reduced to historically 
unusually low 2% of the purchase price and eventu-
ally even to zero (!) percent with loans even excee-
ding this price. Large chunks of these bad debts were 
financed internationally by European, especially 
German credits to banks, so that the huge US debts 
had an international dimension. The dismantling 
of these debts from 2008 onwards meant that large 
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chunks of such debts were actually taken over by the 
US government, thus providing gifts to the debtors. 
Some of the largest banks, e.g. CitiBank, were saved 
by government interference, at high cost to the taxpa-
yer. Finally, government measures caused the richest 
1%, in fact above all the richest 0.1%, of Americans 
to become even richer. (An important article by the 
British economist A.B. Atkinson has documented 
the staggering increase in US income concentration, 
especially among financiers and bankers.) The medi-
an income earner in the USA (50% being higher, 50% 
lower) has actually lost altogether some 2–3% within 
the last 30 years, people in the lower half of the in-
come distribution losing even more, a large number 
of Americans now having negative assets, and only 
the top earners gaining. 
In recent years, several German government loans 
were in effect made at zero interest. In effect, this 
turns them into gifts – possibly involuntary gifts, as 
e.g. when the then French Minister of Finance, Ma-
dame Lagarde, declined to pay interest on a German 
public loan, pleading "force majeure". Gifts, however, 
do not fall under commercial transactions and are 
therefore not part of national income. If Germany up 
to recently was making large loans in effect for free, 
this actually meant that its national income, with at 
present a current account surplus of 7.2% of GDP, 
was up to perhaps 5% of its assumed total every year 
actually smaller than estimated! And when the Eu-
ropean Central Bank was making interest-free loans 
to Greece, repayable only after thirty year duration 
that was evidently once more a mere subterfuge, as 
no one can know what happens on financial markets 
over a period of thirty years. In all probability, these 
"loans" may turn out to have been gifts. 
So, in the Western World we can now observe that 
one of the activities of governments and internatio-
nal financial authorities is direct and indirect giving 
of gifts on a huge scale – only thinly covered up by 
easily discernible accounting tricks. 
On an international scale the main creditor since the 
year 2000 has actually been China with its huge sa-
vings, which come close to one half of ifs social pro-
duct. Of late, though, China too has more and more 
difficulties in receiving positive real returns on the 
credits it gives. 
X
I recapitulate my argument. Since about 100.000 
years, human beings have been able rationally to 
consider longer run economic perspectives. Thus 
they should be able to be better long run forecast-
ers than even apes. But the exact opposite is the case. 
Typically, the USA forecasts an average economic 
growth rate of GDP of +2% a year, higher than in 
Europe, for which the US estimates growth rates e.g. 
for Germany +1% and for France and Italy zero. Cor-
rectly measured and including international debts, 
it should be exactly the opposite: Corrected social 
product is falling most rapidly in the USA, while only 
less so in Germany and Austria, but in the long run 
here, too, social products will fall on average:  mainly 
because of climate change and concomitant increas-
es in the cost and prices of water, energy, and basic 
foods. Since about a quarter century, major political 
entities like the USA have been using man's ability to 
foresee and to forecast for purposes of self-interested 
propaganda, by ignoring or falsifying glaring facts. 
Technically this has been managed by using overop-
timistic short run statistics and by sweeping realistic 
longer run doubts and negative developments under 
the carpet. Economic lies have become rather too 
common. 
